Psychologism and the Prescriptive Function of Logic

Authors
Herman Philipse
Utrecht University
Abstract
Husserl and Frege did not criticize psychologism on the ground that it deduced the norms of logic from non-normative premises (naturalistic fallacy), as is often supposed. Rather, their refutation of psychologism assumes that such a deduction is possible. Husserl compared the rules of logic to those of technology, on the supposition that they have a purely theoretical basis. This conception of logic is critically examined, and it is argued (contra Follesdal) that Frege held a similar view
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/gps19872920
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