Noûs 53 (2):316-346 (2019)

Authors
Ben Phillips
Arizona State University
Abstract
The distinction between perception and cognition has always had a firm footing in both cognitive science and folk psychology. However, there is little agreement as to how the distinction should be drawn. In fact, a number of theorists have recently argued that, given the ubiquity of top-down influences, we should jettison the distinction altogether. I reject this approach, and defend a pluralist account of the distinction. At the heart of my account is the claim that each legitimate way of marking a border between perception and cognition deploys a notion I call ‘stimulus-control.’ Thus, rather than being a grab bag of unrelated kinds, the various categories of the perceptual are unified into a superordinate natural kind.
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12218
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Unconscious Perception Reconsidered.Ian Phillips - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):471-514.
The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 149-170.

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