Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):75-95 (2010)

Tommaso Piazza
University Of Pavia
Quite recently, Luciano Floridi has put forward the fascinating suggestion that knowledge should be analyzed as special kind of information, in particular as accounted information. As I will try tentatively to show, one important consequence of Floridi’s proposal is that the notion of justification, and of evidence, should play no role in a philosophical understanding of knowledge. In this paper, I shall suggest one potential difficulty with which Floridi’s proposal might be consequently afflicted, yet accept the fundamental suggestion that traditional epistemology should be merrily wedded with the philosophy of information; in particular, I shall plead for the less drastic conclusion, according to which, although knowledge should be taken to entail justification, it is the very notion of evidence—in particular of perceptual evidence—that should be analyzed in information-theoretic terms. By so doing, my principal aim will be to explain away an apparent difficulty—which is preliminary to the preoccupations motivating Floridi’s more ambitious attempt—from which Conee and Feldman’s Evidentialism is apparently afflicted. So, the conclusion that I will try to establish is that the notion of perceptual evidence, once it is appropriately analyzed in information-theoretic terms, should play an important role in our understanding of knowledge.
Keywords Knowledge  Evidentialism  Justification  Information-theoretic terms
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12130-010-9102-z
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,391
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
There is Immediate Justification.James Pryor - 2005 - In Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 181--202.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Introduction: Perceptual Evidence.James Genone - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):873-873.
Fixing Perceptual Belief.Gerald Vision - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):292-314.
Is Seeing Believing?David Hilbert - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:446 - 453.
The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
A Perceptual Theory of Knowledge: Specifying Some Details.Aaro Toomela - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):633-634.
Chaotic Itinerancy: Insufficient Perceptual Evidence.Leslie M. Kay - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):819-820.
Nonconceptual Demonstrative Reference.Athanassius Raftopoulos & Vincent Muller - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.


Added to PP index

Total views
62 ( #148,317 of 2,326,334 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #283,481 of 2,326,334 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes