The Reality And The Normativeness Of Truth

The subject of the paper is the issue whether the property of truth as ascribed to sentences and propositions is a real one, i.e. capable of being ascribed to entities such as physical objects, their properties, relations between them, sets of objects, properties of the sets of objects, etc. The point of departure for the analysis is Alfred Tarski’s definition of true sentence in a language L. His definition does not imply anything about the ontology of the property of truth, but it implies instead that for each language there is a multitude of such properties . This claim, however, does have ontological consequences. For this reason a number of the so-called deflationary theories of truth have been proposed. According to them, the expression “property of truth” stands for a heterogeneous set of properties that make a sentence true in a given language, context, etc. The author of the paper argues that deflationary theories eliminate the notion of truth but, together with it, they banish also some other cognitive values which seems contrary to the original intentions of their proponents. The author concludes that the property of truth cannot be captured with the desirable philosophical generality if one holds on to the idea of truth as a property of sentences. Instead he proposes to interpret truth as a property of propositions. In this case it seems more reasonable to speak both of a property of truth and of a norm of truth. As he points out, however, the reasoning along these lines encounters some serious stumble blocks; he concludes that a further account of the predicate involves a shift from propositions to judgments, which in turn implicates one in a temporal structure of judgment-making. He asserts that such an intrusion of metaphysical or transcendental notions simply replaces one problem by an another instead of providing a genuine solution to the original one. He illustrates this fact by invoking Edmund Husserl’s position in Die formale und die transcendentale Logik and in his Erfahrung und Urteil. Since some of Husserl’s notions are incurably mysterious, the author ends up with rather skeptical conclusion that no account of the intuitive bond between the property and the normative character of truth is possible within inherited philosophical frameworks. Key words TRUTH, PROPOSITION, NORM OF TRUTH, PROPERTY OF TRUTH
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,113
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Pluralism and the Absence of Truth.Jeremy Wyatt - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
Truth.Bradley Dowden - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Against Truth.Jamin Asay - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.
Truth as a Substantive Property.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.
The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning.Kari Middleton - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
Truth and Multiple Realizability.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
Truth and Other Self-Effacing Properties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):577–586.
Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth.Alberto Vanzo - 2010 - Kant-Studien 101 (2):147-166.
Tarski's Definition and Truth-Makers.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):57-76.
Did Frege Really Consider Truth as an Object?Dirk Greimann - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148.
The Transparency of Truth.ME Kalderon - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):475-497.


Added to PP index

Total views

Recent downloads (6 months)

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes

Sign in to use this feature