Authors
Tommaso Piazza
University Of Pavia
Abstract
_ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 199 - 205 It is an alleged virtue of Pritchard’s Epistemological Disjunctivism that it makes available a promising line of resistance against the sceptic about perceptual knowledge. According to José Zalabardo’s reconstruction of it, however, this line of resistance—in particular, the solution it supplies to what Pritchard calls the Evidential Problem—is ultimately flawed. Whether or not the solution criticized by Zalabardo is the one supplied by ED —which Pritchard has denied—my aim in this paper is to show that Zalabardo’s criticism of this solution fails. To begin with, I show that it is based on excessively demanding epistemic principles. Moreover, I argue that on a more plausible epistemic principle Zalabardo’s conclusion doesn’t go through.
Keywords Duncan Pritchard   José Zalabardo   epistemological disjunctivism   epistemology of perception   scepticism  Evidential problem
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1163/22105700-00001246
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemological Disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1982 - Critica 14 (41):87-93.

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