Addressing Higher-Order Misrepresentation with Quotational Thought

Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):109-136 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper it is argued that existing ‘self-representational’ theories of phenomenal consciousness do not adequately address the problem of higher-order misrepresentation. Drawing a page from the phenomenal concepts literature, a novel self-representational account is introduced that does. This is the quotational theory of phenomenal consciousness, according to which the higher-order component of a conscious state is constituted by the quotational component of a quotational phenomenal concept. According to the quotational theory of consciousness, phenomenal concepts help to account for the very nature of phenomenally conscious states. Thus, the paper integrates two largely distinct explanatory projects in the field of consciousness studies: (i) the project of explaining how we think about our phenomenally conscious states, and (ii) the project of explaining what phenomenally conscious states are in the first place.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-04-01

Downloads
922 (#24,162)

6 months
126 (#41,709)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Vincent Picciuto
University of Maryland, College Park

Citations of this work

Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):79-98.
Higher-order theories of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Editorial: Self-Consciousness Explained—Mapping the Field.Stefan Lang & Klaus Viertbauer - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):257-276.

Add more citations