Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):226-227 (2010)

Authors
Gualtiero Piccinini
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Abstract
Machery’s argument that concepts split into different kinds is bold and inspiring but not fully persuasive. We will focus on the lack of evidence for the fourth tenet of Machery’s..
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x10000488
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References found in this work BETA

Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Splitting Concepts.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sam Scott - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (4):390-409.

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Citations of this work BETA

Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids.Collin Rice - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):597-619.

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