Bare Particulars and Exemplifcation

American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):95-108 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Bare particulars tend to get a bad rap. But often, the arguments lodged against bare particulars seem to miss important aspects of the theoretical context of bare particulars. In particular, these arguments fail to situate bare particulars within a constituent ontology with substrates, and thus fail to appreciate an important consequence of that context: the need for two types of exemplification. In this paper, I do three things. First, I motivate and describe the need, given bare particulars, for two types of exemplification, and explore more generally how constituent ontologies with substrates ought to think about exemplification. Second, I show how Andrew Bailey’s (2012) new argument against bare particulars fails when that need is charitably considered. Third, I highlight where bare particular theory ought to be pressed, which turns out to be precisely its account of exemplification.



External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

297 (#42,271)

6 months
25 (#55,558)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Timothy Pickavance
Biola University

Citations of this work

Two Ways to Particularize a Property.Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):635-652.
Object.Bradley Rettler & Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1.
Tropes as Character-Grounders.Robert K. Garcia - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):499-515.
Possible Worlds.Christopher Menzel - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tropes as Divine Acts: The Nature of Creaturely Properties in a World Sustained by God.Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (3):105--130.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Particulars in particular clothing: Three trope theories of substance.Peter Simons - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):553-575.
Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong.Gustav Bergmann - 1967 - University of Wisconsin Press.
Four-Dimensional Objects.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Noûs 24 (2):245--255.
"Bare particulars".Theodore Sider - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.

View all 21 references / Add more references