American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):95-108 (2014)

Bare particulars tend to get a bad rap. But often, the arguments lodged against bare particulars seem to miss important aspects of the theoretical context of bare particulars. In particular, these arguments fail to situate bare particulars within a constituent ontology with substrates, and thus fail to appreciate an important consequence of that context: the need for two types of exemplification. In this paper, I do three things. First, I motivate and describe the need, given bare particulars, for two types of exemplification, and explore more generally how constituent ontologies with substrates ought to think about exemplification. Second, I show how Andrew Bailey’s (2012) new argument against bare particulars fails when that need is charitably considered. Third, I highlight where bare particular theory ought to be pressed, which turns out to be precisely its account of exemplification.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance.Peter Simons - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):553-575.
Four-Dimensional Objects.Peter van Inwagen - 1990 - Noûs 24 (2):245--255.
Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong.Gustav Bergmann - 1967 - University of Wisconsin Press.
"Bare Particulars".Theodore Sider - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.
No Bare Particulars.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Object.Bradley Rettler & Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1.
Two Ways to Particularize a Property.Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):635-652.
Tropes as Character-Grounders.Robert K. Garcia - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):499-515.
Possible Worlds.Christopher Menzel - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tropes as Divine Acts: The Nature of Creaturely Properties in a World Sustained by God.Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (3):105--130.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
219 ( #47,201 of 2,456,041 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
39 ( #20,616 of 2,456,041 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes