Computational modeling vs. computational explanation: Is everything a Turing machine, and does it matter to the philosophy of mind?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):93 – 115 (2007)
Abstract
According to pancomputationalism, everything is a computing system. In this paper, I distinguish between different varieties of pancomputationalism. I find that although some varieties are more plausible than others, only the strongest variety is relevant to the philosophy of mind, but only the most trivial varieties are true. As a side effect of this exercise, I offer a clarified distinction between computational modelling and computational explanation.<br><br>.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400601176494
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 25,015
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Vision.David Marr - 1982 - Freeman.

View all 55 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Computation Without Representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
Computing Mechanisms.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.
Computers.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):32–73.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

201 ( #18,732 of 2,082,116 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

25 ( #15,373 of 2,082,116 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums