Deflationism and the function of truth

Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):326-351 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Deflationists claim that the truth predicate was introduced into our language merely to full a certain logico-linguistic function. Oddly enough, the question what this function exactly consists in has received little attention. We argue that the best way of understanding the function of the truth predicate is as enabling us to mimic higher-order quantification in a first-order framework. Indeed, one can show that the full simple theory of types is reducible to disquotational principles of truth. Our analysis has important consequences for our understanding of truth. In this paper, we can only touch on one of them: we will argue that the insubstantiality of truth does not imply a conservativity requirement on our best theories of truth.



External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Deflating Deflationism.Bradley Philip Armour-Garb - 1999 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Levity.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):555-581.
Deflationism and the Value of Truth.James R. Beebe - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:391-402.
What is deflationism about truth?Matti Eklund - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):631-645.
Truth as a Pretense.James A. Woodbridge - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 134.
Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism.Daniel Whiting - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.
Two Types of Deflationism.Aladdin M. Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.
Deflating Logical Consequence.Lionel Shapiro - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
Why Deflationists Should Be Pretense Theorists (and Perhaps Already Are).Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 59-77.


Added to PP

189 (#65,924)

6 months
67 (#12,344)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Lavinia Maria Picollo
University College London
Thomas Schindler
University of Amsterdam

References found in this work

The Thought: A Logical Inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.
A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic.Saul A. Kripke - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (1):1-14.
Facts and Propositions.Frank P. Ramsey - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-170.
VI.—Symposium: “Facts and Propositions.”.F. P. Ramsey & G. E. Moore - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-206.
A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.

View all 29 references / Add more references