Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):97-118 (2017)

Authors
Bryan Pickel
University of Glasgow
Brian Rabern
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
In a series of recent works, Kit Fine, 605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, we argue, that that the semantics is compositional. We then examine the deep consequences of this result for Fine’s proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle. We argue that Fine has mis-diagnosed his own solution–his attempted solution does not deny compositionality. The correct characterization of Fine’s solution fits him more comfortably among familiar solutions to the puzzle.
Keywords Frege's puzzle  proper names  Compositionality  Semantic relationism  variables
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10992-016-9420-z
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Semantic Relationism.Kit Fine - 2007 - Blackwell.
Meaning and Necessity.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - University of Chicago Press.
A Puzzle About Belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Frege’s Puzzle is About Identity After All.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):628-643.
The Antinomy of the Variable: A Tarskian Resolution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (3):137-170.
Relational Approaches to Frege's Puzzle.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429.
Frege’s Puzzle and Semantic Relationism.Surajit Barua - 2019 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 36 (1):197-210.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

In Defense of Formal Relationism.Richard Heck - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):243-250.
Semantic Relationism, Belief Reports and Contradiction.Paolo Bonardi - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):273-284.
The Semantic Relationistic Approach to Generalized Fregean Puzzles.M. A. Minghui - 2012 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 7 (3):404-421.
A Closer Look at Manifest Consequence.Max Weiss - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):471-498.
Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle?Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 202.
A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag’s Puzzle.Philip Atkins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
Searle on Proper Names.Michael McKinsey - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (2):220-229.
Frege’s Distinction Between Sense and Reference.Gideon Makin - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):147-163.
Recurrence.Nathan Salmon - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):407-441.
Troubles with Direct Reference.Pierre Baumann - 2012 - Fenomenologia. Diálogos Possíveis Campinas: Alínea/Goiânia: Editora da Puc Goiás 93:33-51.
Frege Puzzles?Joseph Almog - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):549 - 574.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-01-07

Total views
559 ( #9,039 of 2,330,282 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
61 ( #8,863 of 2,330,282 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes