Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 34 (3):597-612 (2003)
Epistemic divergence occurs when different investigators give different answers to the same question using evidence-collecting methods that are not public. Without following the principle that scientific methods must be public, scientific communities risk epistemic divergence. I explicate the notion of public method and argue that, to avoid the risk of epistemic divergence, scientific communities should (and do) apply only methods that are public.
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References found in this work BETA
Data From Introspective Reports: Upgrading From Common Sense to Science.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):141-156.
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Idealizations and Scientific Understanding.Moti Mizrahi - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):237-252.
Methodological Naturalism and its Misconceptions.Tiddy Smith - forthcoming - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-16.
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