Quaestio 10:207-218 (2010)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
The following paper shows that prior to Ockham’s doctrine on the intuition of non-existents, two Parisian theologians had already developed, in opposition to Duns Scotus, their own theories on the possibility of having intuitive cognition of non-existent or absent things. The article uses the editions of the two theologians’ Quodlibeta prepared by the author
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1484/J.QUAESTIO.1.102334 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Hervaeus Natalis.John P. Doyle - 2011 - In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer. pp. 472--473.
The Scotist Background in Hervaeus Natalis's Interpretation of Thomism.Isabel Iribarren - 2002 - The Thomist 66 (4):607-627.
""Hervaeus Natalis: An Early" Thomist" on the Notion of Being.Elliott B. Allen - 1960 - Mediaeval Studies 22 (1):1-14.
Some Observations on the «Fictum» Theory in Ockham and Its Relation to Hervaeus Natalis.Francis E. Kelley - 1978 - Franciscan Studies 38 (1):260-282.
A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis († 1323), The Doctor Perspicacissimus, On Second Intentions Vol. I: An English Translation Vol. II: A Latin Edition. [REVIEW]Stanislav Sousedík - 2008 - Studia Neoaristotelica 5 (2):197-198.
Franciscus de Prato: Facetten Seiner Philosophie Im Blick Auf Hervaeus Natalis Und Wilhelm von Ockham.Christian Rode - 2004 - Steiner.
Les Conditions de Possibilité de la Théologie Comme Science.David Piché - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (3):331-364.
Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century.Stephen F. Brown, Thomas Dewender & Theo Kobusch (eds.) - 2009 - Brill.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2013-12-19
Total views
22 ( #471,735 of 2,411,819 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #538,761 of 2,411,819 )
2013-12-19
Total views
22 ( #471,735 of 2,411,819 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #538,761 of 2,411,819 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads