Analysis 73 (4):613-626 (2013)

Hanna Pickard
Johns Hopkins University
I clarify some ambiguities in blame-talk and argue that blame's potential for irrationality and propensity to sting vitiates accounts of blame that identify it with consciously accessible, personal-level judgements or beliefs. Drawing on the cognitive psychology of emotion and appraisal theory, I develop an account of blame that accommodates these features. I suggest that blame consists in a range of hostile, negative first-order emotions, towards which the blamer has a specific, accompanying second-order attitude, namely, a feeling of entitlement—a feeling that these hostile, negative first-order emotions are what the blamed object deserves
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ant075
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.

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Citations of this work BETA

Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3).
The Emotion Account of Blame.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):257-273.
Instrumentalism About Moral Responsibility Revisited.Anneli Jefferson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):555-573.

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