Not All Speakers are Equal: Harm and Conversational Standing

Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 1 (84) (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

McGowan has provided a linguistic mechanism that explains how speech can constitute harm. Her idea is that utterances routinely enact s-norms about what is permissible in a given context. My aim is to argue that these s-norms are sensitive to the conversational standing of the speaker. In particular, I claim that the strength of the norm enacted depends on the standing of the speaker. In some cases, the speaker might even lack the standing required to enact new s-norms.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,006

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-05-11

Downloads
51 (#335,172)

6 months
22 (#179,316)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Claudia Picazo
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

Citations of this work

Distorted Debates.Claudia Picazo - 2022 - Topoi 42 (2):561-571.

Add more citations

References found in this work

How to do things with words.John Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press. pp. 179.
Speech acts and unspeakable acts.Rae Langton - 1993 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (4):293-330.

View all 16 references / Add more references