The ontology of creature consciousness: A challenge for philosophy

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):103-104 (2007)
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Abstract

I appeal to Merker's theory to motivate a hypothesis about the ontology of consciousness: Creature consciousness is (at least partially) constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. Rather than elaborating theories of phenomenal consciousness couched solely in terms of state consciousness, as philosophers are fond of doing, a correct approach to phenomenal consciousness should begin with an account of creature consciousness.

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Gualtiero Piccinini
University of Missouri, St. Louis

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