Journal of Philosophy 115 (2):57-91 (2018)

Authors
Bryan Pickel
University of Glasgow
Moritz Schulz
Universität Hamburg
Abstract
Quine challenged traditional views of the a priori by appealing to two key premises: that any statement may be held true “come what may” and that no statement is immune to revision in light of new experience. Chalmers has recently developed a seemingly compelling response to each of these claims. The critique is particularly threatening because it seems to rest on the Bayesian premise that upon acquiring evidence E, a rational agent will update her credence in any statement S to equal her prior conditional credence in S given E. We argue that Chalmers’s criticisms misfire. When properly understood, Quine’s two theses are largely consistent with Bayesianism.
Keywords Chalmers  Quine  Bayesianism  Belief Revision
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil201811524
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