Causing Actions

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2000)
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Abstract

Paul Pietroski presents an original philosophical theory of actions and their mental causes. We often act for reasons: we deliberate and choose among options, based on our beliefs and desires. However, bodily motions always have biochemical causes, so it can seem that thinking and acting are biochemical processes. Pietroski argues that thoughts and deeds are in fact distinct from, though dependent on, underlying biochemical processes within persons.

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Paul Pietroski
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Representing knowledge.Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (1):97-143.
Trying without fail.Ben Holguín & Harvey Lederman - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-28.
The contents of perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Proxy Agency in Collective Action.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - Noûs 48 (1):75-105.

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