Can Hinge Epistemology Close the Door on Epistemic Relativism?

Synthese (1-2):1-27 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices.

Similar books and articles

Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.
Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.
Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.
Rethinking Epistemic Relativism.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):587-607.
Why Epistemic Pluralism Does not Entail Relativism: Collingwood’s Hinge Epistemology.Giuseppina D’Oro - 2018 - In Karim Dharamsi, Giuseppina D'Oro & Stephen Leach (eds.), Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 151-175.
Common Sense, Scepticism and Deep Epistemic Disagreements.Angélique A. Thébert - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (2):129-155.
Summa Contra Scepticos.Martin Kusch - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):184-193.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-12-07

Downloads
1,161 (#10,323)

6 months
338 (#5,714)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.
Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.

View all 36 references / Add more references