Defending underdetermination or why the historical perspective makes a difference

In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 303--313 (2010)

Authors
Wolfgang Pietsch
Technische Universität München
Abstract
The old antagonism between the Quinean and the Duhemian view on underdetermination is reexamined. In this respect, two theses will be defended. First, it is argued that the main differences between Quine's and Duhem's versions of underdetermination derive from a different attitude towards the history of science. While Quine considered underdetermination from an ahistorical, a logical point of view, Duhem approached it as a distinguished historian of physics. On this basis, a logical and a historical version of the underdetermination thesis can be distinguished. The second thesis of the article is that the main objections against underdetermination are fatal only to the logical rendering. Taken together, the two theses constitute a defence of underdetermination
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References found in this work BETA

Exceeding Our Grasp.Kyle Stanford - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):135-139.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.John G. Kemeny - 1951 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 17 (4):281-283.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hidden Underdetermination: A Case Study in Classical Electrodynamics.Wolfgang Pietsch - 2012 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):125-151.
Parfit, Convergence, and Underdetermination.Marius Baumann - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (3).

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