History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (3):211-228 (2005)

This paper is a discussion of Gödel's arguments for a Platonistic conception of mathematical objects. I review the arguments that Gödel offers in different papers, and compare them to unpublished material (from Gödel's Nachlass). My claim is that Gödel's later arguments simply intend to establish that mathematical knowledge cannot be accounted for by a reflexive analysis of our mental acts. In other words, there is at the basis of mathematics some data whose constitution cannot be explained by introspective analysis. This does not mean that mathematics is independent of the human mind, but only that it is independent of our ?conscious acts and decisions?, to use Gödel's own words. Mathematical objects may then have been created by the human mind, but if so, the process of creation cannot be completely analysed and re-enacted. Such a thesis is weaker than some of the statements that Gödel made about his conceptual realism. However, there is evidence that Gödel seriously considered this weak thesis, or a position depending only on this weak thesis. He also criticized Husserl's Phenomenology from this point of view
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DOI 10.1080/01445340500112124
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References found in this work BETA

Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Matthew McGrath - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):239-242.
Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):516-518.
On the Philosophical Development of Kurt Gödel.Mark Van Atten & Juliette Kennedy - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):425-476.

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Citations of this work BETA

Non-Representational Mathematical Realism.María José Frápolli - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3):331-348.
Gödel, Percepção Racional E Compreensão de Conceitos.Sérgio Schultz - 2014 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 40 (1):47-65.
Proof Vs Provability: On Brouwer’s Time Problem.Palle Yourgrau - 2020 - History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (2):140-153.

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