Intentionality and teleological error

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):267-82 (1992)

Authors
Paul Pietroski
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Theories of content purport to explain, among other things, in virtue of what beliefs have the truth conditions they do have. The desire for such a theory has many sources, but prominent among them are two puzzling facts that are notoriously difficult to explain: beliefs can be false, and there are normative constraints on the formation of beliefs.2 If we knew in virtue of what beliefs had truth conditions, we would be better positioned to explain how it is possible for an agent to believe that which is not the case. Moreover, we do not say merely of such an agent that he believes that p when p is not the case. We say the agent made a mistake, and often criticize him accordingly; we think agents ought not have false beliefs, and that such beliefs should be changed; etc. An adequate theory of content would, presumably, reveal the source of these normative facts about the mental lives of agents. Indeed, it is typically taken to be an adequacy constraint on a theory of content that it help explain the possibility of error and the "normativity" of content. Teleological theories of content promise to do just this
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Intentionality  Teleology  Truth
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A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics.Barry M. Loewer - 1997 - In C. Wright & Bob Hale (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell: Oxford. pp. 108-126.

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