Husserl et les catégories. Langage, pensée, perception

The purpose of this book is to investigate the roots of phenomenology and to analyse, from a historical and systematic point of view, the reasons that enabled Husserl to set down in his Logical Investigations the conditions of a strictly descriptive philosophy. The ‘breakthrough’ of phenomenology was made possible by Husserl’s investigations on the specificity of logical forms, and was grounded upon his ability to establish in the Logical Investigations a descriptive distinction between sensitive and categorial forms. Such distinction allows Husserl to account for the possibility of a certain kind of adequacy between speech and perception that is necessarily involved in phenomenological description. Indeed, as a descriptive activity, phenomenology entails the opposition between two fundamentally different modalities of intentionality that both take part in description: intuition on the one hand and signification on the other. By making the adequacy between signification and intuition possible, ‘categorial intuition’ not only sheds new light on the relations between thought and perception, or between seeing and thinking, it also legitimates phenomenological description as a philosophical method. This book proposes a new and revisited reading of the Logical Investigations by examining Husserl’s reform of the theory of categories and its relation to the phenomenological method of description.