The Neutral State and the Mandatory Crucifix
Religion and Human Rights 6 (3):259–264 (2011)
In this article we present a conceptual overview of relevant interpretations of what state neutrality may imply; we suggest a distinction between inclusive neutrality and exclusive neutrality. This distinction provides a useful framework for understanding the several positions as presented by the parties in the Lautsi case. We conclude by suggesting a solution of the Lautsi case that might provide a more viable solution.
|Keywords||neutrality crucifix Lautsi liberalism European Court if Human Rights|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
The Impossibility of Political Neutrality.Noriaki Iwasa - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):147-155.
Privilege or Recognition? The Myth of State Neutrality.Tim Nieguth - 1999 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2 (2):112-131.
The Right to Life: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.Douwe Korff - unknown
Beyond Equality of What: Sen and Neutrality.Christopher Lowry - 2009 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 4 (2):226-235.
Liberal Neutrality or Liberal Tolerance?Colin M. Macleod - 1997 - Law and Philosophy 16 (5):529 - 559.
Why Liberal Neutralists Should Accept Educational Neutrality.Matt Sensat Waldren - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):71-83.
Rawls and Feminism: What Should Feminists Make of Liberal Neutrality?Elizabeth Brake - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (3):293-309.
Interpreting the Notion That Technology is Value-Neutral.Per Sundström - 1998 - Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy 1 (1):41-45.
Added to index2012-04-08
Total downloads196 ( #21,795 of 2,172,023 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #173,295 of 2,172,023 )
How can I increase my downloads?