Arguing about constitutive and regulative norms

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 28 (2-3):189-217 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Formal arguments are often represented by pairs, but in this paper we consider normative arguments represented by sequences of triples, where constitutive norms derive institutional facts from brute facts, and regulative norms derive deontic facts like obligations and permissions from institutional facts. The institutional facts may be seen as the reasons explaining or warranting the deontic obligations and permissions, and therefore they can be attacked by other normative arguments too. We represent different aspects of normative reasoning by different kinds of consistency checks among these triples, and we use formal argumentation theory to resolve conflicts among such normative arguments. In particular, we introduce various requirements for arguing about norms concerning violations, contrary-to-duty obligations, dilemmas, conflict resolution and different kinds of norms, and we introduce a formal argumentation theory satisfying the requirements. In order to illustrate our framework, we introduce a running example based on university regulations for prospective and actual students.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On norms of competence.Eugenio Bulygin - 1992 - Law and Philosophy 11 (3):201 - 216.
Belief, normativity and the constitution of agency.Emer O'Hagan - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):39-52.
Freedom without law.Harrison P. Frye - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (3):298-316.
Constitutive Rules in Context.Corrado Roversi - 2010 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 96 (2):223-238.
The needs of understanding: Kant on empirical laws and regulative ideals.James R. O'Shea - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):216 – 254.
Meaning and rule following.Hans-Johann Glock & James D. Wright - 2015 - In Glock, Hans-Johann (2015). Meaning and rule following. In: Wright, James D. International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition). Amsterdam: Elsevier, 841-849. pp. 841-849.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-09-04

Downloads
28 (#556,922)

6 months
5 (#638,139)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gabriella Pigozzi
Université Paris Dauphine

References found in this work

Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.

View all 27 references / Add more references