Beyond belief: deep disagreement and conversion in Wittgenstein’s philosophy

Synthese 205 (1):1-25 (2025)
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Abstract

Following Robert Fogelin’s work, philosophers have traditionally analysed deep disagreements in Wittgenstein’s thought through the lens of “On Certainty.” This paper explores another fruitful avenue for understanding Wittgenstein’s views on deep disagreements: this avenue lies in examining the form of disagreement that arises between believers and non-believers, as documented in his “Lectures on Religious Belief”. Drawing on this text and others, I will try to demonstrate how deep disagreement, starting from a situation of incompatibility and mutual non-persuasiveness between the parties, can, through the intermediary stage of mutual partial emotive understanding, lead sometimes to an extreme form of resolution: the conversion of one’s own way of seeing things to that of the other party. This conversion, however, does not rely on an appeal to explanations, reasons, or rationality. Instead, it appeals to the overcoming of a blockage by the will. This concept of a complete reorientation of one’s own perspective is central to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and may even be considered the ultimate goal of his mature work.

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