Episteme 4 (2):219-232 (2007)
Abstract Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic “oughts” that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. But the beliefforming strategy of not believing conspiracy theories would be a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of selfmutilation. I discuss several variations of this strategy, interpreting “conspiracy theory” in different ways but conclude that on all these readings, the conventional wisdom is deeply unwise
|Keywords||conspiracy theories Karl Popper rationality belief-forming strategies Tony Blair Iraq War|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Complots of Mischief.Charles Pigden - 2006 - In David Coady (ed.), Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Ashgate. pp. 139-166.
The Miracle of Theism.J. L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Anthony Kenny & Terence Penelhum - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):46-53.
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