Choosing your beliefs

Abstract

This paper presents and discusses a novel approach to indeterministic belief revision. An indeterministic belief revision operator assumes that, when an agent is confronted with a new piece of information, it can revise its belief sets in more than one way. We define a rational agent not only in terms of what it believes but also of what it desires and wants to achieve. Hence, we propose that the agent’s goals play a role in the choice of (possibly) one of the several available revision options. Properties of the new belief revision mechanism are also investigated.

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2009-01-28

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Gabriella Pigozzi
Université Paris Dauphine

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References found in this work

Input/output logics.David Makinson & Leendert van der Torre - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (4):383-408.
Input/Output Logics.David Makinson & Leendert van der Torre - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (4):383 - 408.
Logic of belief revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Constraints for Input/Output Logics.David Makinson & Leendert van der Torre - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (2):155 - 185.
Realistic desires.Jan Broersen, Mehdi Dastani & Leendert van der Torre - 2002 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 12 (2):287-308.

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