Palgrave-Macmillan (2010)

Charles R. Pigden
University of Otago
It ‘seems altogether inconceivable', says Hume, that this ‘new relation' ought ‘can be a deduction' from others ‘which are entirely different from it' The idea that you can't derive an Ought from an Is, moral conclusions from non-moral premises, has proved enormously influential. But what did Hume mean by this famous dictum? Was he correct? How does it fit in with the rest of his philosophy? And what does this suggest about the nature of moral judgements? This collection, the first on this topic for forty years, assembles a distinguished cast of international scholars to discuss these questions. The book combines, historical scholarship, meta-ethics and cutting-edge research in philosophical logic. It includes three distinct attempts to reformulate and prove No-Ought-From-Is in the face of Prior's famous counterexamples. Contributors: A.N. Prior, Gerhard Schurz, Charles Pigden, J.M.Shorter, Annette.C.Baier, Wade Robison, Adrian Heathcote, Alan Musgrave, Norva Y.S. Lo, Gillian Russell, Hakan Salwén, Greg Restall, Peter Vranas, Edwin Mares, Stephen Maitzen
Keywords Meta-Ethics  Is/Ought  David Hume  Arthur Prior  Autonomy of Ethics  Naturalistic Fallacy
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Call number B1499.E8.H838 2010
ISBN(s) 9780230205208   1349586137   0230205208
DOI philnow20118330
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Remembering: Epistemic and Empirical.Carl F. Craver - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):261-281.
Truthmaking and the is—Ought Gap.Kit Fine - 2018 - Synthese 198 (2):887-914.

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