Palgrave-Macmillan (2009)

Charles R. Pigden
University of Otago
Contemporary ethical thought owes a great deal to David Hume whose work has inspired theories as diverse as non-cognitivism, error theory, quasi-realism, and instrumentalism about practical reason. This timely volume brings together an international range of distinguished scholars to discuss and dispute issues revolving around three closely related Humean themes which have recently come under close scrutiny. First is Hume's infamous claim that 'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions'. Second, the Motivation Argument for the view that 'The rules of morality...are not conclusions of our reason'. The third and final theme is that of virtue, re-examined here in the context of new interpretational debates concerning Hume's thought on moral motivation. Contributors: Annette Baier, Stephen Finlay, Kent Hurtig, Rosalind Hursthouse, Richard Joyce, Norva Y. S. Lo, Graham Oddie, Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Luke Russell, Constantine Sandis, Michael Smith, Christine Swanton
Keywords Ethics  Meta-Ethics  Motivation Argument  Slavery of Reason Thesis  Non-Cognitivism  Error Theory  Virtue Ethics  David Hume
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Call number B1499.E8.H84 2009
ISBN(s) 9780230205277   0230205275
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Expressivism and Moore's Paradox.Jack Woods - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-12.

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