Naturalism

In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell. pp. 421-431 (1991)

Abstract

Survey article on Naturalism dealing with Hume's NOFI (including Prior's objections), Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy and the Barren Tautology Argument. Naturalism, as I understand it, is a form of moral realism which rejects fundamental moral facts or properties. Thus it is opposed to both non-cognitivism, and and the error theory but also to non-naturalism. General conclusion: as of 1991: naturalism as a program has not been refuted though none of the extant versions look particularly promising.

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References found in this work

Logic and the Basis of Ethics.Arthur Norman Prior - 1949 - London, England: Oxford University Press.
Logic and the Basis of Ethics.Arthur N. Prior - 1951 - Philosophy 26 (98):270-272.

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Citations of this work

Naturalizing Ethics.Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian & David Wong - 2016 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. London, UK: pp. 16-33.
The Conditions of Moral Realism.Christian Miller - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.
Critical Notice.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):475 – 488.

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