Naturalism

In Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell. pp. 421-431 (1991)

Authors
Charles R. Pigden
University of Otago
Abstract
Survey article on Naturalism dealing with Hume's NOFI (including Prior's objections), Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy and the Barren Tautology Argument. Naturalism, as I understand it, is a form of moral realism which rejects fundamental moral facts or properties. Thus it is opposed to both non-cognitivism, and and the error theory but also to non-naturalism. General conclusion: as of 1991: naturalism as a program has not been refuted though none of the extant versions look particularly promising.
Keywords Is/Ought  Naturalism  Naturalistic Fallacy  Moore  Hume  Anscombe  Geach
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The Conditions of Moral Realism.Christian Miller - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:123-155.
Critical Notice.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):475 – 488.

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