On the notion of admissibility in chance-credence principles: A comment on Vranas


Lewis’ Principal Principle (PP) aims at clarifying the connection between chance (i.e. objective probability) and credence (i.e. subjective probability). It is generally assumed that the chance that an event will occur does not depend on our credence in the occurrence of that event. Nevertheless, chances constrain our credence, and Lewis’ PP is an attempt to capture this connection.



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Gabriella Pigozzi
Université Paris Dauphine

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