Defending Humeanism

Dissertation, Princeton University (1997)
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Abstract

So-called Humean theories of practical rationality elaborate on David Hume's famous dictum that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions". According to Humeanism, beliefs alone cannot determine what one rationally should do. Desires are always involved in practical reasons. A version of Humeanism is developed and defended in this dissertation. ;Its basic principle is the following: If a person believes that some event x increases the likelihood of the occurrence of some other event y, whereby y is something this person wants to occur, then he or she has thereby a reason for wanting x to occur. Humeanism is the minimalist view that this basic principle is all that is needed in a theory of practical reasons. Contrary to what is widely assumed, Humeanism does not exclude so-called intrinsic desires from rational criticism. It provides not a foundational but rather a coherentist approach to practical justification. ;Against Thomas Nagel I argue that Humeanism does provide a satisfying account of prudence. Whether one should make a sacrifice for some future gain will depend on contingent facts about how much a person cares about his or her own future self. ;Using Michael Smith as example of a philosopher who holds an opposing view, I try to show how Humeanism can resist a separation of motivating reasons from normative reasons. Humeanism explains as well as justifies actions by reference to the actual beliefs and desires of an agent. ;I discuss an argument by David Lewis that tries to show that any anti-Humean theory of practical reasons would be incompatible with independently plausible principles of rationality. After showing that this argument would prove too much, I locate a technical problem in Lewis's argument related to his treatment of what are arguably second-order attitudes. ;Finally I show that certain phenomena, like everyone's special concern for the people who are close to him- or herself, speak against an anti-Humean theory of practical reasons according to which one's desires should be in accordance with one's beliefs about how good or valuable something is, thereby vindicating Humeanism indirectly

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Christian Piller
University of York

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