Knowledge as Achievement -- Greco's Double Mistake

In C. Jaeger & W. Loeffler (ed.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values Disagreement (2012)
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Abstract

John Greco claims that knowledge is a kind of achievement. The value achievements have (as such) shows, according to Greco, why knowledge is better than mere true belief. I argue that, for a variety of reasons, it is not always good to know. Furthermore, it is wrong to think that achievements are always good – think of achieving what is bad. Greco is mistaken twice; this leaves the idea that knowledge is a kind of achievement intact.

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Christian Piller
University of York

References found in this work

A Virtue Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):427-440.
Valuing Knowledge: A Deontological Approach.Christian Piller - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):413-428.

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