Authors
Christian Piller
University of York
Abstract
If our mental attitudes were reasons, we could bootstrap anything into rationality simply by acquiring these mental attitudes. This, it has been argued, shows that mental attitudes cannot be reasons. In this paper, I focus on John Broome’s development of the bootstrapping objection. I distinguish various versions of this objection and I argue that the bootstrapping objection to mind-based accounts of reasons fails in all its versions.
Keywords Intentions  Reasons  Reasoning  Broome  Bratman
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values.John Broome - 2001 - In Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press. pp. 98--120.
Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?John Broome - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

One Dogma of Philosophy of Action.Matthew Smith - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2249-2266.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-07-14

Total views
434 ( #13,958 of 2,331,429 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
71 ( #7,313 of 2,331,429 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes