Valuing Knowledge: A Deontological Approach

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):413-428 (2009)
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Abstract

The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification, thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem.

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Christian Piller
University of York

Citations of this work

Treating Broome Fairly.Christian Piller - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (2):214-238.
In Defence of Swamping.Julien Dutant - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):357-366.
The value and normative role of knowledge.Julien Dutant - 2014 - Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.

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References found in this work

Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.

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