Authors
David Pineda
University of Girona
Abstract
Physicalism is usually understood as the claim that every empirical entity is or is determined by physical entities. The claim is however imprecise until it is clarified what are the physical entities in question. A sceptical argument in the form of a dilemma tries to show that this problem of formulation of physicalism cannot be adequately met. If we understand physical entities as the entities introduced by current physics, the resulting claim becomes most probably false. If we instead understand physical entities as those entities introduced by some future ideal physics, the claim then becomes indeterminate in content. Both horns seem equally bad. In the first part of the paper, I survey the strengths and weaknesses of different proposed solutions to this problem of formulation. In the second part, I lay out a new formulation of physicalism, partly based on a mereological principle, which overcomes the dilemma, and argue that it is a correct formulation of physicalism to the extent that it rules out clear antiphysicalist scenarios and is compatible with clear physicalist scenarios
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/02698590600960929
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,132
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Language and Mind.Noam Chomsky - 1968 - Cambridge University Press.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

View all 47 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Current Physics and 'the Physical'.Agustín Vicente - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):393-416.
Teleosemantics and Productivity.Manolo Martinez - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):47-68.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Physicalism, Supervenience and the Fundamental Level.Robin Brown & James Ladyman - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):20-38.
On Characterizing the Physical.Jessica Wilson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.
Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom.Jessica M. Wilson - 2010 - British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
Physicalism and the Argument From Knowledge.Nathan Stemmer - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):84-91.
The Rise of Physicalism.David Papineau - 2000 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.). Cambridge University Press.
Current Physics and 'the Physical'.Agustín Vicente - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):393-416.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
98 ( #111,228 of 2,454,729 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,768 of 2,454,729 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes