How to avoid inconsistent idealizations

Synthese 191 (13):2957-2972 (2014)
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Abstract

Idealized scientific representations result from employing claims that we take to be false. It is not surprising, then, that idealizations are a prime example of allegedly inconsistent scientific representations. I argue that the claim that an idealization requires inconsistent beliefs is often incorrect and that it turns out that a more mathematical perspective allows us to understand how the idealization can be interpreted consistently. The main example discussed is the claim that models of ocean waves typically involve the false assumption that the ocean is infinitely deep. While it is true that the variable associated with depth is often taken to infinity in the representation of ocean waves, I explain how this mathematical transformation of the original equations does not require the belief that the ocean being modeled is infinitely deep. More generally, as a mathematical representation is manipulated, some of its components are decoupled from their original physical interpretation

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Christopher Pincock
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

Model Explanation Versus Model-Induced Explanation.Insa Lawler & Emily Sullivan - 2021 - Foundations of Science 26 (4):1049-1074.
Concrete Scale Models, Essential Idealization, and Causal Explanation.Christopher Pincock - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):299-323.
How to make reflectance a surface property.Nicholas Danne - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 70:19-27.
On Batterman's 'On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science'.Christopher Pincock - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):211 - 217.

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References found in this work

Naturalism in mathematics.Penelope Maddy - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Mathematics and Scientific Representation.Christopher Pincock - 2012 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Second philosophy: a naturalistic method.Penelope Maddy - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method.Penelope Maddy - 2007 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.

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