How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox

Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1661-1680 (2018)
Authors
Mark Pinder
Bristol University
Abstract
The general thesis of this paper is that metasemantic theories can play a central role in determining the correct solution to the liar paradox. I argue for the thesis by providing a specific example. I show how Lewis’s reference-magnetic metasemantic theory may decide between two of the most influential solutions to the liar paradox: Kripke’s minimal fixed point theory of truth and Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. In particular, I suggest that Lewis’s metasemantic theory favours Kripke’s solution to the paradox over Gupta and Belnap’s. I then sketch how other standard criteria for assessing solutions to the liar paradox, such as whether a solution faces a so-called revenge paradox, fit into this picture. While the discussion of the specific example is itself important, the underlying lesson is that we have an unused strategy for resolving one of the hardest problems in philosophy.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0928-z
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 36,586
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
What Good Are Counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
The Essential Tension.T. S. Kuhn - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (4):359-375.
Putnam's Paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Radical Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Dialectica 27 (1):314-328.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Liar Paradox in New Clothes.Jeff Snapper - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):319-322.
Buridan's Solution to the Liar Paradox.Yann Benétreau-Dupin - 2015 - History and Philosophy of Logic 36 (1):18-28.
This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox. Atkins - 2011 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):421-444.
On a Medieval Solution to the Liar Paradox.Keith Simmons - 1987 - History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (2):121-140.
The Byzantine Liar.Stamatios Gerogiorgakis - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (4):313-330.
The Paradox of Liar and Fazil Sarab's Solution.Muhammed Ejei - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 36.
Undeniably Paradoxical: Reply to Jacquette.John Barker - 2008 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):137-142.
The Liar: What Paradox? [REVIEW]Avrum Stroll - 1988 - Argumentation 2 (1):63-75.
Semantic Defectiveness and the Liar.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.
No Consistent Way with Paradox.B. Armour-Garb - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):66-75.
Denying The Liar.Dale Jacquette - 2007 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):91-98.
The Liar Paradox and Bivalence.Douglas Steven Oro - 1988 - Dissertation, Brown University

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-05-21

Total downloads
26 ( #249,246 of 2,303,776 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #200,692 of 2,303,776 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature