Theoria 20 (2):199-219 (2005)

Silvio Mota Pinto
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana
Michael Beaney ha sugerido recientemente que la distinción fregeana entre sentido y referencia fue propuesta para resolver la famosa paradoja del análisis. Casi diez años antes, Michael Dummett ya insistia en que Frege fue uno de los prirneros en buscar una soluci6n satisfactoria de esta paradoja. En esre articulo, discuto algunas sugerencias de Beaney y Dummett de cómo resolver la paradoja al estilo fregeano y tarnbién sus propias contribuciones no fregeanas al debate en torno de la corrección y de la informatividad del análisis. Mi intención en esta discusión es mostrar que ninguna de ellas funciona. Concluyo con una propuesta de inspiración witttgensteiniana --el enfoque de los conceptos abiertos- para apoyar la idea de que la apelación a contertidos abiertos es la rnejor rnanera de disolver la paradoja.Michael Beaney has recently suggested that the Fregean distinction between sense and reference was proposed to solve the famous paradox of analysis. Not as recently, Michael Dummett has insisted that Frege was one of the first to look for a satisfactory solution to this paradox. In this paper, I discuss Beanry’s and Dummett’s various suggestions for solving the paradox in a Fregean style as well as their own non Fregean contributions to the debate around analysis’s correction and informativeness. My intention in this discussion is to show that none of them works. I conclude with a proposal inspired by Wittgenstein’s later work -the open concepts’ proposal- designed to support the idea that the appeal to open contents is the best way to dissolve the paradox
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DOI theoria200520216
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Meaning and Necessity.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - University of Chicago Press.
The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael DUMMETT - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.

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