Misprinted Representations in Stoicism

Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 56 (2):325-351 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper deals with the Stoic concept of misprinted representation (φαντασία παρατυπωτική), which has received little attention compared to other concepts of Stoic epistemology and philosophy of mind. I aim at showing that a better understanding of this concept is important for grasping some elements of the Stoic account of mental representations that have been ignored or misunderstood in modern Stoic scholarship. First, by clarifying the status of the misprinted representation as a genuine representation, we can understand what it means (and does not mean) to say, from the Stoic point of view, that the intentional object of a representation is the external object that caused it. Second, by understanding this issue, we obtain some resources to deal with the ambiguity of the preposition ἀπό in the definition of cognitive representation. Thus, the concept of misprinted representation proves to be important for appropriately understanding the Stoic concepts of representation and cognitive representation.

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Christian Pineda
National Autonomous University of Mexico

References found in this work

The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):640-642.
The Birth of Belief.Jessica Moss & Whitney Schwab - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1):1-32.
The Stoic Account of Apprehension.Tamer Nawar - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-21.

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