Abstracta 3 (1):29-45 (2006)

Authors
Silvio Mota Pinto
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana
Abstract
In chapter 5 of his 1992 book A Study of Concepts, Christopher Peacocke claims that his account of concepts can be reconciled with naturalism. Nonetheless, despite Peacocke’s greatest efforts to convince the skeptics that the mentioned accommodation is viable if one accepts his approach to concepts, some suspicion survives. In a recent paper on this very topic, Jose Luis Bermudez raises questions about Peacocke’s supposed naturalization by arguing that the approach in question is not able to make sense of the distinction between misapplying a concept one nonetheless possesses and not possessing that concept at all. What I am going to do here is, on the one hand, defend Peacocke’s concept naturalization project from Bermudez’s objection and, on the other hand, show that the latter’s suggestion cannot save the surely crucial distinction between making a mistake in using a concept and being incapable of a mistake or a correct use because of not having the concept.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 56,081
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Emperor’s New Concepts.Neil Tennant - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):345-377.
The Non-Circularity Constraint: Peacocke Vs. Peacocke.Dan López de Sa - 2003 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-2):85-93.
The Non-Circularity Constraint: Peacocke Vs. Peacocke. L. - 2003 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-2):85-93.
Introduction.Neil Tennant - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):1-3.
Peacocke on Red and Red.Michael A. Smith - 1986 - Synthese 68 (September):559-576.
Concepts and Epistemic Individuation.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):290-325.
Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.
Concepts, Abilities, and Propositions.Hans-Johann Glock - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):115-134.
The Campaign for Concepts.Tania Lombrozo - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (1):165-177.
Naturalism and Conceptual Norms.Jose Luis Bermudez - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):77-85.
Peacocke y el Concepto de Primera Persona.Angel Garcia Rodriguez - 2002 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 17 (1):161-185.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-06

Total views
20 ( #510,777 of 2,403,822 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #550,507 of 2,403,822 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes