Non‐committal Causal Explanations
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170 (2010)
Abstract
Some causal explanations are non-committal in that mention of a property in the explanans conveys information about the causal origin of the explanandum even if the property in question plays no causal role for the explanandum . Programme explanations are a variety of non-committal causal (NCC) explanations. Yet their interest is very limited since, as I will argue in this paper, their range of applicability is in fact quite narrow. However there is at least another variety of NCC explanations, causal orientation explanations, which offer a plausible model for many explanations in the special sciencesAuthor's Profile
Reprint years
2011
DOI
10.1080/02698595.2010.484540
My notes
Similar books and articles
A defense of a unificationist theory of explanation.Rebecca Schweder - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (4):421-435.
Forms of causal explanation.Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Robrecht Vanderbeeken - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (4):437-454.
Teleological explanations and their relation to causal explanation in psychology.Elizabeth R. Valentine - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):61-68.
Dispositional Explanations of Behavior.Rob Vanderbeeken & Erik Weber - 2002 - Behavior and Philosophy 30:43 - 59.
Understanding science: Why causes are not enough.Ruth Berger - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (2):306-332.
Causal and Mechanistic Explanations in Ecology.Jani Raerinne - 2010 - Acta Biotheoretica 59 (3):251-271.
Causal depth, theoretical appropriateness, and individualism in psychology.Robert A. Wilson - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (1):55-75.
Deflationism and the success argument.By Nic Damnjanovic - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):53–67.
Analytics
Added to PP
2010-08-11
Downloads
81 (#152,531)
6 months
3 (#228,007)
2010-08-11
Downloads
81 (#152,531)
6 months
3 (#228,007)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
References found in this work
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.