Análisis Filosófico 24 (2):135-164 (2004)

Authors
David Pineda
University of Girona
Abstract
En este artículo exploro el compatibilismo, el punto de vista según el cual la tesis del hiato o hueco explicativo entre lo fenoménico y lo físico es compatible con una metafísica fisicista. Defiendo que el argumento del dualismo de propiedades es un argumento incompatibilista más fuerte que el argumento de Jackson-Chalmers o el de Kripke y exploro críticamente algunos intentos recientes de replicar al mismo. La conclusión a la que llego es que una posición compatibilista capaz de dar una respuesta adecuada al argumento del dualismo de propiedades sigue todavía pendiente de articulación. In this paper I explore compatibilism, the view that the claim that there is an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and the physical is compatible with an overall physicalist metaphysics. I argue that the property dualism argument is an incompatibilist argument which is stronger than the Jackson-Chalmers argument or Kripke's argument and I critically explore some recent attempts in the literature to deal with it. The conclusion is that a compatibilist view, one able to cope with the property dualism argument, is still pending
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat.Thomas Nagel - 1974 - E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 5.
Troubles with Functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.
Phenomenal States.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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