Reichenbach, Russell and scientific realism

Synthese 199 (3-4):8485-8506 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper considers how to best relate the competing accounts of scientific knowledge that Russell and Reichenbach proposed in the 1930s and 1940s. At the heart of their disagreements are two different accounts of how to best combine a theory of knowledge with scientific realism. Reichenbach argued that a broadly empiricist epistemology should be based on decisions. These decisions or “posits” informed Reichenbach’s defense of induction and a corresponding conception of what knowledge required. Russell maintained that a scientific realist must abandon empiricism in favor of knowledge of some non-demonstrative principles with a non-empirical basis. After identifying the best versions of realism offered by Reichenbach and Russell, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of the limitations of these two approaches.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,480

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Conventionalism and Realism in Hans Reichenbach's Philosophy of Geometry.Carsten Klein - 2001 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (3):243 – 251.
Inference, Practice and Theory.F. John Clendinnen - 1977 - Synthese 34 (1):89 - 132.
Scientific Realism.Bruce Reichenbach - 2010 - In Melville Stewart (ed.), Science and Religion in Dialogue. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 1011--1033.
Reichenbach's Metaphysical Picture.Hilary Putnam - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):99--114.
Choosing the Realist Framework.Stathis Psillos - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):301 - 316.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-05-19

Downloads
12 (#797,852)

6 months
1 (#417,896)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Pincock
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations