Authors
Giorgio Pini
Fordham University
Abstract
Scotus’s views on objective being — i.e. the special way objects of thought are supposed to be in the mind — have been recently interpreted in different ways. In this paper, I argue that Scotus’s apparently contradictory statements on objective being can be made sense only if they are read against the background of his theory of essence. Specifically, I claim that a key point of Scotus’s position is that objects of thoughts are in the mind but have mind-independent identity (they are in the mind but not of the mind). I defend my interpretation by focusing on a usually neglected passage from Scotus’s Questions on the Metaphysics where Scotus provides an unusually explicit (if short) account of what he takes ‘to be objectively in the intellect’ to mean.
Keywords John Duns Scotus  objective being  medieval theories of cognition
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