Wittgenstein's Anti-Platonism

Grazer Philosophische Studien 56 (1):109-132 (1998)

Abstract
The philosophy of mathematics of the later Wittgenstein is normally not taken very seriously. According to a popular objection, it cannot account for mathematical necessity. Other critics have dismissed Wittgenstein's approach on the grounds that his anti-platonism is unable to explain mathematical objectivity. This latter objection would be endorsed by somebody who agreed with Paul Benacerraf that any anti-platonistic view fails to describe mathematical truth. This paper focuses on the problem proposed by Benacerraf of reconciling the semantics with the epistemology for mathematics. It is claimed that there is a way of solving Benacerrafs problem along the lines suggested by Wittgenstein's later remarks on mathematics. This will require demonstrating that a satisfactory conception of mathematical objectivity can be extracted from his mature philosophy
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/gps1998/99567
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