Public Affairs Quarterly 34 (2):142-168 (2020)

Control accounts of moral responsibility argue that agents must possess certain capacities in order to be blameworthy for wrongdoing. This is sometimes thought to be revisionary, because reflection on our moral practices reveals that we often blame many agents who lack these capacities. This paper argues that Control accounts of moral responsibility are not too revisionary, nor too permissive, because they can still demand quite a lot from excused wrongdoers. Excused wrongdoers can acquire duties of reconciliation, which require that they improve themselves, make reparations for the harm caused, and retract the meaning expressed in the original wrong. Failure to do these things expresses a lack of regard for the victims, and can make those wrongdoers appropriate targets of blame.
Keywords Moral Responsibility  Blame  Reactive Attitudes  Excuses
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What Do We Want From A Theory of Epistemic Blame?Adam Piovarchy - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.

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