Philosophy of Science 76 (5):838-850 (2009)

Monika Piotrowska
State University of New York, Albany
Comparative genomicists seem to be convinced that the unit of measurement employed in their studies is a gene that drives the function of cells and ultimately organisms. As a result, they have come to some substantive conclusions about how similar humans are to other organisms based on the percentage of genetic makeup they share. I argue that the actual unit of measurement employed in the studies corresponds to a structural rather than a functional gene concept, thus rendering many of the implications drawn from comparative genomic studies largely unwarranted, if not completely mistaken. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, 215 South Central Campus Drive, Carolyn Tanner Irish Humanities Building, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84112; e‐mail: [email protected]
Keywords Human Genome  DNA  Comparative Genomics  Reduction  Similarity  Gene
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DOI 10.1086/605813
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References found in this work BETA

What Genes Can't Do.Lenny Moss - 2002 - MIT Press.
The Century of the Gene.Evelyn Fox Keller - 2001 - Journal of the History of Biology 34 (3):613-615.
Genes Made Molecular.C. Kenneth Waters - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (2):163-185.
What Genes Can’T Do.Lenny Moss - 2003 - Journal of the History of Biology 38 (2):383-384.

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Citations of this work BETA

Sequence Matters: Genomic Research and the Gene Concept.Laura Perini - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):752-762.
Genetics and Philosophy: An Introduction.Monika Piotrowska - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):223-226.

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