What do We Want from a Theory of Epistemic Blame?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):791-805 (2021)
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ABSTRACT This paper identifies a number of questions that any plausible theory of epistemic blame ought to answer. What is epistemic blame? When is someone an appropriate target of epistemic blame? And what justifies engaging in epistemic blame? I argue that a number of problems arise when we try to answer these questions by using existing conceptions of moral blame. I then consider and reject Brown’s [2020] belief-desire model of epistemic blame. Finally, I argue that an agency-cultivation model of moral responsibility is not only able to help us to develop a plausible theory of epistemic blame; it is particularly well-placed to do so.



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Adam Piovarchy
University of Notre Dame Australia

Citations of this work

Epistemic blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.
Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.
Epistemic Atonement.Elise Woodard - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 18. Oxford University Press.
Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.

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References found in this work

Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.

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